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INTRODUCTION
In Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity Shapes
Supreme Decision-Making, 1 Professor Andrew Coan makes the
provocative argument that judicial capacity is the most determinative
factor in the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation, especially
regarding such critical realms as equal protection, takings, and the
horizontal and vertical separation of powers. He contends that the Supreme
Court’s legitimate anxiety over managing workflow to the federal bench
operates more powerfully to shape its responses to the questions raised in
these areas of law than any alternative theories of constitutional
interpretation, including the doctrinal models popular most among legal
academics and the strategic models more popular among political
scientists. 2 This essay assesses the major strengths and weaknesses of
Coan’s argument, contrasting its convincing explanatory power with some

*
This essay is based on a presentation at the WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW’s 2019
symposium on Andy Coan’s provocative new book, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW
JUDICIAL CAPACITY SHAPES SUPREME DECISION-MAKING (2019).
**
Erin Ryan is the Elizabeth C. & Clyde W. Atkinson Professor, Florida State
University College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, M.A., Wesleyan University, B.A.,
Harvard University. I write with great gratitude to Andy Coan, who has so keenly
challenged us with this wonderful work, and to the WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW for bringing
us together for this wonderful book club. I am also very thankful to Ashley Edwards and
Amelia Ulmer for their research assistance in support of this project.
1.
ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY
SHAPES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING (2019).
2.
Id. at 40–47.
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of the limits of its own breadth of field. It also explores the intersection of
his theory with a different capacity-driven theory of constitutional
interpretation that I first offered in Negotiating Federalism 3 and later in
FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN. 4
Andy’s essential argument is that structural limitations on how much
attention federal judges can give to any individual case assert powerful but
underappreciated constraints on the kinds of decision rules those judges
render in interpreting constitutional dilemmas. 5 Too often, he argues, the
Supreme Court reacts to this pressure by creating decision rules more
responsive to the limits of judicial capacity than to the substantive legal
values at stake in a given constitutional dispute. 6 For Coan, judicial
capacity is thus the most reliably dispositive factor in much of the Supreme
Court’s subject matter jurisprudence—explaining why the Court so often
turns to bright-line categorical rules that limit judicial discretion in
complex constitutional arenas where litigation might otherwise
overwhelm the federal bench. 7 More troubling, he contends that the Court
gravitates toward categorical rules to cope with capacity pressures even
when the complex nature of constitutional disputes makes categorical
rules sub-optimal on the merits, especially in the realms of constitutional
federalism and separation of powers, equal protection, and takings. 8
Some readers will be more persuaded than others on different parts
of the argument, but we all owe a debt of gratitude to Andy for challenging
us with this provocative invitation to reconsider some of the canonical
theories of constitutional interpretation that it threatens to disrupt. I was
especially interested in the way that his theory of judicial capacity
intersects with my own theory of negotiated governance within Balanced
Federalism, which recognizes the interpretive value of certain bilaterally
negotiated outcomes by political branches in federalism contexts where
judicial capacity is low. 9 Although we do not cover the exact same
theoretical territory, Andy and I share the deep concern that the Court’s
federalism jurisprudence sometimes misuses categorical rules in contexts
where they are necessarily under- or over-inclusive, failing to account for
critical nuances in complex cases, controversies, and policy dilemmas. 10
3.
Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism].
4.
ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011) [hereinafter
RYAN, F&TWW].
5.
See COAN, supra note 1, at 2–9.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
See generally RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4.
10.
For that reason, the subtitle of my presentation, Coan, Mud, and Crystals in
the Context of Dual Sovereignty, is a direct homage to Carol Rose, who famously helped
us think so effectively about the implications of deploying crystalline rules and muddier
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Andy may not have anticipated that his argument would support mine, but
his critique of how capacity constraints cause the Court to reach suboptimal solutions in the federalism context provides critical theoretical
support for my claim that federalism interpretation should be shared
among all three branches according to the distinctive capacity that each
brings to the interpretive enterprise. 11
The remarks that follow will assess some of the strengths and
weaknesses of Coan’s provocative argument and explore the support that
the capacity theory provides for the role of interpretive intergovernmental
bargaining in contexts of jurisdictional overlap. I’ll begin with an
overview of Coan’s book, paying homage to some of his most important
contributions. There are many, of course, but in Part I, I’ll review three in
particular. First, there is the undeniable explanatory power of his model in
accounting for the plethora of bright-line rules and categorical deference
that we find among the Court’s jurisprudence in the areas he highlights. In
light of this model, Coan provides valuable advice to litigants about how
to advocate around the capacity constraints of judicial decision-making.
Perhaps even more important are the admonitions he offers the rest of us
about how the limits of judicial capacity should temper our expectations
about the role of the courts in a legal system within which courts are only
one component.
In Part II, I’ll consider the intersection between RATIONING THE
CONSTITUTION, especially its analysis of the Court’s federalism
jurisprudence, and my own theory of negotiated governance within
Balanced Federalism. As noted, we share a strong skepticism about the
Court’s use of “bright-line” categorical rules in its federalism
jurisprudence, and the implications for judicial competence in these
arenas. I’ll make the case that Coan’s analysis of the limits of judicial
capacity buttresses my own claims in favor of intergovernmental
bargaining in the interjurisdictional gray area as an alternative means of
interpreting federalism where judicial capacity is low.
standards to resolve problems like these. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
11.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 181–214, 265–70, 339–70 (discussing
what the Balanced Federalism model involves). As I describe in subsequent work,
“Balanced Federalism emphasizes dynamic interaction among the various levels of
government and shared interpretive responsibility among the three branches of
government, with the overall goal of achieving a balance among the competing federalism
values that is both dynamic and adaptive over time. The full elaboration in [F&TWW]
helps provide the missing theoretical justification for the tools of cooperative federalism
that predominate in modern American governance, as well as support for future moves by
environmental governance toward even greater dynamic engagement. It emphasizes the
skillful deployment of legislative, executive, and judicial capacity at each level of
federalism-sensitive governance, allocating authority based on the specific forms of
decision-making in which they excel.” Erin Ryan, Secession and Federalism in the United
States, 96 OR. L. REV. 123, 161 (2017) [hereinafter Secession and Federalism].
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Finally, in Part III, and notwithstanding the admiration that I have for
the work overall, I’ll nod to some of the limits that I see in Coan’s theory.
I’ll suggest that in his robust critique of categorical rules, Coan
nevertheless applies one himself, in a way that conflates important
differences between the bright-line categorical deference that the Court
applies in some contexts and the deferential but discretionary review that
it applies in others. Coan also presents the capacity model as distinct from
the predominant models of judicial interpretation that preceded it—the
attitudinal, legalist, and strategic models—but I’ll suggest that the capacity
model is really symbiotic with them, and in some regards, already
accounted for within them.
I’ll close by pressing Andy to think more seriously about a systemic
remedy for the problems he so aptly identifies here—in which limited
judicial capacity leads to suboptimal judicial decision-making. After all,
one potential solution to the problem Coan identifies is to vastly expand
the courts by seating more judges, which would alleviate capacity
constraints by directly increasing capacity. Yet another potential
conclusion one might draw from his work is that we should reduce the size
and importance of the judiciary, yielding greater power to the political
branches, because courts are inherently unable to manage the
responsibilities, we heap upon them in the framework of adversarial
process. It’s unclear which of these alternatives would be preferable to
Andy, but given the strength of the rest of his presentation, I think we’d
all like to hear his normative recommendations.
I. COAN’S MODEL OF CAPACITY-CONSTRAINED INTERPRETATION
This part briefly outlines the thrust and then the strengths of Coan’s
argument. The book warrants praise, especially for its powerful
explanation of the Court’s penchant for categorical rules in legal realms
that would strain judicial capacity, for the guidance it offers litigants
operating within the capacity-constrained system, and for the clear-eyed
assessment it provides of how judicial capacity also limits judicial
competence—even in circumstances where we traditionally have high
expectations for the courts.
A. Overview
In a very small nutshell, Coan’s argument is that the federal judiciary
lacks the capacity—in terms of the sum total of hearts, minds, and human
hours available each day—that would be necessary to resolve all the cases
that come before it in the most optimal way. 12 As he explains, there are

12.

COAN, supra note 1, at 13–18.
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comparatively few federal judges available to hear cases in a large nation,
and far fewer Supreme Court justices. 13 Accordingly, there is only so
much these individuals can do, even with all the institutional support
provided by the federal court system. This inherent capacity limitation puts
strong pressure on the Supreme Court to craft rules of adjudication that
will limit the flow of cases to the federal bench beyond what it can
effectively handle within minimal professional standards. 14
As a result, Coan argues that in legal domains where the Court is
worried about being overwhelmed, it has no choice but to either “defer to
the political process, employ hard-edged categorical rules, or both.” 15 The
Court will prefer decision rules that limit how closely judges must engage
with the facts of each case, and how often they are asked to assess them,
because otherwise, the system of justice would simply grind to a halt. 16
Alternative approaches that invite broader judicial discretion and closer
scrutiny of individual circumstances would simply invite more timeconsuming litigation than the judiciary could realistically handle—at least
without sacrificing certain bedrock principles of judicial administration
that we are collectively unwilling to sacrifice, such as minimum
professional standards, due process, and legal-quality workmanship. 17
Equally important, the Court will create categorical rules to limit
disuniformity across the federal circuits to a tolerable level, reflecting
concerns that too much disuniformity among the lower courts could call
into question both the rule of law and the effectiveness of the judiciary
within it. 18
Coan summarizes his fundamental claim by analogizing to a family
budget: the Supreme Court can’t spend more capacity than it has, so it
must effectively “ration” constitutional adjudication by creating rules that
limit the time and effort federal judges will have to spend engaging with
the kinds of cases that most dangerously threaten these harms. 19 He
concedes exceptions in some areas of law, where the Court has created
vague standards or bucked majoritarian impulses that invite more
litigation than the capacity model would predict. 20 But even if it is not
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at 19–31.
15.
Id. at 32.
16.
Id. at 32–37.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 20–21.
20.
See, e.g., id. at 202–03 (noting the Court’s willingness to invalidate major
federal statutes in contrast to the predictions of the judicial capacity model, such as the
Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519 (2012), the Gun-Free Schools Act in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
and the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000));
id. at 77 (describing how such Spending Clause cases as United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
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perfect, Coan argues that it still outperforms any of its chief competitors
at explaining judicial behavior. And on this point, it must be conceded that
the capacity model has real explanatory power.
He then distinguishes these primary alternative models, which he
identifies as the Attitudinal, Legalist, and Strategic Models. 21 Coan finds
the capacity model superior to the pragmatic Attitudinal Model, a favorite
of political scientists, which assumes that judges will decide cases based
on personal political ideologies just as legislators do in enacting policy. 22
He also considers the more heroic Legalist Model, which explains judicial
decisions in terms of constitutional text, history, precedent, and judges’
principled commitments to, for example, the rule of law, judicial restraint,
or other legal process ideals. 23 Coan points out that law professors and
judges are almost romantically attached to this model and therefore
proceed from its assumptions most often—but he concludes that it, too,
falls short of the predictive power of the capacity model. 24 Finally, he
considers the Strategic Model, which merges elements of Game Theory
and Positive Political Theory into the Attitudinal model for the long
game. 25 This model acknowledges that justices’ strategic anticipation of
how other institutional actors are likely to react to their moves can
constrain individual political bias in the short term to preserve credibility
for accomplishing preferred outcomes further down the line. 26 While Coan
concedes different values in each approach, he maintains that none comes
close to the accuracy with which the capacity model can predict
outcomes. 27
Moreover, Coan predicts that based on the constraints of judicial
capacity, the Court will be especially predisposed toward categorical rules
or broad judicial deference in three specific varieties of legal disputes. The
first, which he coins “high volume legal domains,” are subject matter areas
in which there is likely to be lots of litigation, such that the sheer number
of potential legal claims could exceed capacity for meaningful judicial
oversight. 28 If the Court were to craft a fact-responsive, discretionary
1 (1936), and NFIB run counter to the judicial capacity model); id. at 115 (citing Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), as an example from the Court’s Equal Protection
jurisprudence and Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513 (2013), as an example from
the Court’s Takings jurisprudence that depart from the predictions of the capacity model).
See also id. at 37 (noting that the Court’s decisions during the New Deal era did not
conform to the capacity model).
21.
Id. at 40–47.
22.
Id. at 42–44.
23.
Id. at 41–42.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 44–46.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 40–47.
28.
Id. at 25–28.
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standard, the time and energy it would take to handle the resulting
litigation would overwhelm the courts beyond their ability to manage. 29
For an example of this kind of legal issue, Coan cites takings claims by
plaintiffs alleging the government has burdened their property rights. 30
The second variety that will be especially constrained by judicial
capacity are “high stakes legal domains,” which are legal matters on which
the Supreme Court cannot tolerate disuniformity among the circuits for
prudential reasons and must therefore resolve the issue. 31 For example, the
Supreme Court feels pressure to resolve circuit splits created whenever a
court in one region of the country invalidates a congressional statute while
others reach a different result. 32 As a result, the Court is unlikely to open
the flood-gates for discretionary decision-making in these arenas,
providing categorical guidance to avoid more disuniform decision-making
in high-stakes legal arenas than it can effectively resolve. 33 And of course,
the third and most capacity-constrained legal arenas are the “hybrid”
domains that involve both high-volume and high-stakes legal issues,
maximizing pressure on the Court to create categorical rules. 34
Coan then spends time exploring how the Supreme Court has
managed several of these hybrid domains—areas of law that, if not
managed wisely, could portend dangerously high volumes of high stakes
litigation—by creating categorical rules. 35 He begins with federalism, a
classic example of a hybrid “high-volume/high-stakes” domain, in which
capacity constraints have operated to produce, he argues, suboptimal
categorical rules in the Court’s consideration of Commerce and Spending
Clause claims. 36
If the Commerce Clause became the subject of judicial discretion
through a more contextually contingent judicial standard, that could make
an enormous number of claims more available for judicial review, and
these decisions would also be of the high-stakes variety, as the court would
not tolerate different responses from different parts of the country on the
same federal statutes. 37 Lots of federal legislation is grounded in the
Commerce Clause, and virtually every statute invalidated by a lower court
will require Supreme Court review. 38 Coan explains that the Court’s
solution to this potential problem has been to categorically defer to

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 28–29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Congress—requiring the lower courts to sustain congressional statutes
against challenges with just a few narrow limits at the margins, thereby
avoiding the onslaught of high-stakes adjudication otherwise required. 39
Coan makes the same claim about the Spending Clause, for the same
reasons. 40 Lots of federal legislation is rooted in the Spending Power, so
there would be many claims, and all would involve the potential for
invalidating federal statutes, requiring Supreme Court review. If the Court
were to reject categorical deference for more judicial discretion in
interpreting Spending Clause cases, the federal bench would strain to
guarantee uniformity across the polity. 41
Coan argues that in opting for categorical deference, the Court has
eschewed the use of looser standards that would enable the kind of judicial
analysis that could yield more nuanced interpretive results that better
adjudicate among the competing values at stake. To demonstrate a
competing model that would better grapple with the complexity of these
cases, he points to the dissenting position taken by Justice Cardozo in
Carter v. Carter Coal 42 near the beginning of the Court’s modern
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 43 In Carter Coal, Justice Cardozo
cogently argued for a more fact and context specific analysis for assessing
Commerce Clause violations. 44 Yet the Court has never taken that path,
notwithstanding the potentially superior results it could yield from a
substantive perspective, because, Coan says, doing so would throw open
the floodgates to litigation that could easily overwhelm available judicial
capacity. 45
In addition to the Commerce and Spending Clause, Coan analyzes
categorical rules that the Court has adopted in its Separation of Powers,
Equal Protection, and Takings jurisprudence as hybrid-driven results of
which the capacity model is predictive. 46 He does concede that there are
exceptions, such as his recognition that the model is actually less
predictive in the Spending Power context than he might expect, 47 given
the Court’s introduction in National Federation of Independent
Businesses 48 (NFIB) of the new “anti-leveraging” constraint on Congress’s
spending power, a standard amply critiqued as vague. 49 Indeed, the fact
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 76–87.
41.
Id.
42.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
43.
Id. at 324–41 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
44.
COAN, supra note 1, at 61–62.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
COAN, supra note 1, at 66.
48.
Nat’l Fed’n Indep, Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
49.
Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebelius, 85
U. COLO. L. REV. 1003, 1036 (2014) [hereinafter Spending Power].
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that the NFIB rule threatens to do exactly what capacity theory says the
Courts should avoid—opening an avalanche of high-stakes, high-volume
litigation—somewhat undercuts the force of Coan’s argument, indicating
that, at the very least, there is more operating behind the Court’s decisionmaking than simple capacity planning (but more about that in Part III).
And that, very much in brief, is the case that Coan makes for the capacity
model of Supreme Court interpretation.
B. Strengths
While reading Coan’s book, a famous scientific aphorism came to
mind: “[A]ll models are wrong, but some are useful.” 50 And indeed,
whether or not one accepts his entire theory as correct, Coan deserves a
good deal of credit for some of the very useful insights that he derives from
his observations and analysis. To begin with, there is undeniable
explanatory power in Coan’s assessment of many of the realms of law he
analyzes, where bright-line rules and categorical deference really do
permeate the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. There is plain, inexorable
logic in the notion that the Court has chosen these, in part, to avoid the
crisis of judicial capacity that might ensue under a more complex set of
interpretive decision rules. In this regard, Coan’s argument just makes
sense. It’s hard to argue that capacity constraints are not part of the picture.
It’s what the legalists have previously referred to as “prudential” concerns,
addressing, for example, the importance of administrability. 51
Moreover, Coan’s analysis suggests cogent advice to litigants on how
to craft their legal arguments in terms of judicial capacity. 52 Advocates
should look for ways to frame their preferred outcome in terms favorable
to judicial economy, and to characterize their opponents’ requested
outcome as a threat to judicial capacity. 53 By the same token, advocates
should consider how courts may be constrained by capacity on the issues
they are seeking redress, and then think carefully about what they are
asking for. 54 They should carefully assess whether the rule they are likely
to get from a capacity-constrained judiciary will really advance their goals
in litigation. 55 If a categorical limit will be more hurtful than helpful to the
concerns that motivated their suit, they should reconsider their line of
argument, their litigation strategy, and perhaps even their choice to
50.
Quote attributed to the British statistician George E. P. Box. The Royal
Statistical Society, George Box, a Model Statistician, SIGNIFICANCE (Sept. 2010)
https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2010.00442.x
(“Essentially all models are wrong, but some are useful.”).
51.
See COAN, supra note 1, at 41–42, 180–81.
52.
Id. at 204–05.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
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litigate. 56 If a categorical approach will indeed, advance their goals, then
they should use the capacity theory wisely in argumentation. 57
Coan’s analysis also offers important advice for jurists, scholars, and
policy makers to be equally mindful of the limits of judicial capacity when
creating, expanding, or allocating judicial authority. 58 For example,
legislators might think carefully before including purposeful judicial
remedies in statutes if categorical rules are unlikely to produce optimal
results in adjudication. 59 Scholars should not blindly assume that courts
are best positioned to consider the particulars of cases and controversies if
categorical rules prevent this. 60 And courts themselves, especially the
justices of the Supreme Court, should consider more forthrightly how the
rules they create are vulnerable to categorical bias in light of capacity
constraints. 61
Yet most important of all, perhaps, is Coan’s warning about just how
seriously the limits of judicial capacity can undermine judicial competence
in realms where we ordinarily take it as a matter of faith that judicial
competence exceeds that of the political branches.
Coan makes the important point that judicial capacity is an
overlooked factor when we assess judicial competence to decide specific
issues relative to other institutional actors, because capacity limits their
ability to do the kind of focused analysis that would best suit the needs of
the situation. 62 Good governance theory is preoccupied with the question
of which branch of government is best suited to deal with which kinds of
questions (certainly mine has been). 63 In these debates, the proponents of
judicial review often assume all sorts of judicial institutional advantages
that make them a better forum for decision-making in cases and
controversies compared to other institutional actors in the legislative or
executive branches. 64 They may argue that the judiciary is best suited to
resolve important legal dilemmas through adversarial litigation, because,
for example, judges are highly educated, principled actors who are less
likely than legislators or executive branch actors to have a personal stake
in the issues they are deciding. We assume that they will stand up for
counter majoritarian principles and take the time to resolve each individual

56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 198–207.
59.
Id. at 204–07 (advising advocates to temper expectations about what the
judiciary can realistically accomplish in light of capacity constraints).
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at xii–xvi, 1–6; Ryan, Secession and
Federalism, supra note 11, at 153–62.
64.
COAN, supra note 1, at 203.
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case on the merits, in contrast to the majoritarian impulses of the
legislature and the broad-brush approaches of regulations and statutes.
Yet these intuitions, says Coan, fail to account for the reality of the
circumstances within which judges do their work. 65 It may well be true
that their sources of competence look excellent on paper; their resumes
may make each individual look like an agent of competence whose
discretion we would rightly value in problem-solving. But their delivery
on that potential is fatally compromised by their inability to allow those
sources of competence to fully operate to inform their good judgement,
because capacity limitations remove their meaningful discretion. 66
Coan goes on to describe how the limits of judicial capacity can
complicate the constitutional “choice set” of alternatives for crafting legal
rules, because when the first-best choice is unworkable due to capacity
limitations, the second best choice is often a very distant second,
potentially doing more harm than good. 67 In other words, when we
compare judicial capacity with legislative capacity to resolve a particular
kind of controversy, we may prefer judicial capacity because of the way it
can theoretically consider all the individual inputs from a politically
neutral way to craft a fitting resolution to an individual case in context.
However, if judicial capacity constraints take that kind of adjudication off
the table, and the second best choice is a non-discretionary bright-line rule
or categorical deference that cannot consider any of the factual nuances,
then we might have chosen legislative or executive capacity instead, to
make a more nuanced policy accounting for different facts in different
circumstances. 68
Finally, Coan shatters the most hallowed halo with which we crown
the judiciary, which is its designated role as the protector of unpopular
principles and other disfavored minorities. Coan argues that capacity
problems even limit the Court’s ability to make good on its promise of
providing a counter-majoritarian bulwark against popular misdirection
and even tyranny, because standing up to truly majoritarian impulses may
strain capacity beyond tolerance. 69 Defying a prevailing social norm will
necessarily prompt pushback in the form of ample litigation, to which
courts might not be able to devote appropriate attention. If the Supreme
Court fears that the federal bench will be overwhelmed by litigation that it
cannot effectively manage within the constraints of professional norms, it
may pass on that conflict altogether. 70

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 165–68.
Id.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 191–92.
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The bottom line, and it’s a very important one, is that Coan urges us
to not have unrealistic expectations of what the judiciary can do. 71 The
limits of judicial capacity are necessarily also limits on judicial
competence, even in those realms where we have most romanticized the
judicial role. That alone is an exceedingly valuable contribution of the
book.
It also leads me to the intersection with my own work, so let me now
turn to that subject.
II. JUDICIAL COMPETENCE AND BALANCED FEDERALISM
Coan’s critique of judicial competence in RATIONING THE
CONSTITUTION was especially interesting to me because of the way it
dovetails with my own work on negotiated governance, especially within
the model of Balanced Federalism that I proposed in FEDERALISM AND
THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN and the work that preceded it. 72 His insights
about how capacity constraints limit judicial competence help explain why
state and federal actors so often negotiate solutions to federalism
dilemmas, 73 and they support the need for bilaterally negotiated solutions
as a constitutional alternative to judicial federalism interpretation where
judicial competence/capacity 74 is low (and where minimum standards of
fair bargaining are met). 75 This Part reviews our shared critique of “brightline” categorical rules in federalism jurisprudence, and how the limits on
judicial competence that Coan identifies promote the phenomenon of
federalism bargaining.
A. Skepticism over Bright-Line Federalism Rules
While Coan and I pursue different theoretical objectives in our
books, we begin with a shared critique of the misuse of categorical rules
in the federalism context, finding that they are often too blunt an
instrument to accomplish the task with the delicacy required. 76 Federalism
71.
Id.
72.
See generally RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4; Erin Ryan, Federalism at the
Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment
Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Federalism at the Cathedral].
73.
See RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 20–21. See generally id. at 265–70.
74.
A quick note on shared and contrasting vocabulary between these books:
Federalism and the Tug of War Within uses the word “capacity” to refer to a variety of
competencies, including expertise, legal authority, jurisdiction, operationalism, etc. See
generally, RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4. RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION uses the word
more specifically, to refer to the availability of resources to perform a specific task. See
generally, Coan supra note 1.
75.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 104–10, 339–40.
76.
Id. at 141–44 (“Haunted by the ghost of classical dualism, the cases
effectively ask us to identify zones of properly local and national authority and protect each
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disputes generally require a determination about which competing level of
government should have the final say in regulatory conflicts where each
has a legitimate claim to authority. 77 But in the most vexing federalism
conflicts, both the state and federal actors have strong claims for authority
under different aspects of constitutional text and precedent. 78 Lacking
clearer constitutional guidance about who should get to decide,
interpreters wrestle with the task of allocating contested authority in ways
that will best protect the underlying values of constitutional federalism. 79
As I’ve argued elsewhere, American federalism is essentially a project of
managing the tension between incommensurable constitutional values,
including:
[T]he maintenance of (1) checks and balances between opposing
centers of power that protect individuals; (2) governmental
accountability and transparency that enhance democratic
participation; (3) local autonomy that enables interjurisdictional
innovation and competition; (4) centralized authority to manage
collective action problems and vindicate core constitutional
promises; and finally (5) the regulatory problem-solving
synergy that federalism enables between the unique governance
capacities of local and national actors for coping with problems
that neither can resolve alone. 80

from incursion by the other, narrowing the expanse of permissible jurisdictional overlap.
Reinforced by those decisions’ preference for formal doctrinal rules that eschew
consideration of functional consequences, the enterprise is akin to ‘bright-line rule’
jurisprudence—in which the judiciary articulates ‘clearly defined, highly administrable’
lines separating permissible from impermissible activity.”) (internal citations omitted). See
also Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 72, at 67–68 (discussing the
implications of bright-line rule jurisdictional separation for federalism bargaining); RYAN,
F&TWW, supra note 4, at 256–57.
77.
RYAN, F&TTW, supra note 4, at 2.
78.
Erin Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism: Dynamic Federalism as
a Strategy for Good Governance, 2017 WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 17, 25 [hereinafter Ryan,
Negotiating Environmental Federalism]; Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism's Tug of
War Within, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 355 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2015) [hereinafter Ryan, EFTWW].
79.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 141. See generally Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, supra note 3.
80.
Ryan, Secession and Federalism, supra note 11, at 154–55. See also RYAN,
F&TTW, supra note 4, at xiv, 34–67 (specifically detailing the values of checks,
transparency, localism, and synergy and dealing more holistically with the nationalism
values necessarily implied by a federal system). In the original book, I discussed the four
federalism values most directly voiced in American federalism jurisprudence: checks and
balances, transparency and accountability, localism values, and the problem-solving value
implied by subsidiarity. Later, I added overt discussion of the values of centralized power
that counterbalance the localism values within federalism. See Ryan, EFTWW, supra note
78, at 362–64, n.41.
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And when adjudicating between multiple incommensurate values, there is
often no clear “right answer” to the problem, as there could be countless
possible outcomes that appropriately balance competing values in
different ways.
Without belaboring points that I’ve made elsewhere, environmental
and land use law offer some of the most compelling examples of these
dilemmas, because they “allocate power in regulatory contexts where both
the state and federal claims to authority are simultaneously at their
strongest.” 81 These problems usually match “the need to regulate the
harmful use of a specific parcel of land—something we normally think of
as a local matter—with the need to regulate the boundary-crossing harms
associated with that use,” one of the “original predicates” of national
authority. 82 Land and environmental law are especially prone to federalism
dilemmas because locally distinctive geography proves so salient, but
similar dilemmas arise in in other legal realms that pit states’ traditional
police powers to protect the public health and safety against newer federal
powers to resolve collective action and prevent spillover harms, such as
health, education, criminal, and family law. 83
When jurisdictional conflicts arise in circumstances like these,
discretion matters. The ability to respond to the unique facts and
circumstances in each individual controversy are critical. The judiciary
might be up to the task if judges are unfettered to consider the specifics,
drawing on all the features of judicial competence that we idealize, such
as neutrality, expertise, intelligence, compassion, and faithfulness to the
public interest writ large. However, these features will be unavailable if
judicial competence has been undercut by the Court’s mandatory
application of the categorical rules that Coan decries. In that case, the
judiciary may not command any real advantage over the competence of
other branches of government in resolving federalism dilemmas—and in
important ways suggested by Coan’s analysis, they may have even less
competence. 84 In some of these circumstances, a bilaterally negotiated
resolution between genuinely consenting political actors may have more
interpretive merit than one produced by a judicial umpire hopelessly trying
to call balls and strikes during the equivalent of a four-dimensional
quidditch match. 85

81.
Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism, supra note 78, at 21
(emphasis removed); see also Ryan, EFTWW, supra note 78, at 372.
82.
Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism, supra note 78, at 22; see also
Ryan, EFTWW, supra note 78, at 372.
83.
Ryan, Negotiating Environmental Federalism, supra note 78, at 22; see also
Ryan, EFTWW, supra note 78, at 355–56, nn.1–10.
84.
COAN, supra note 1, at 165–78.
85.
See Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 135–36; RYAN,
F&TWW, supra note 4, at 368–72.
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Bright line rules serve well enough in the outer rings of federalism
adjudication, where the Constitution provides clearer instructions about
who is responsible for what (and accordingly, how to balance the
competing federalism values at stake)—such who should be responsible
for military engagement overseas (the nation), and who is responsible for
managing elections (the states). 86 But the difficult federalism dilemmas
that Coan and I worry about take place in “the interjurisdictional gray
area”—the awkward inner rings where both the state and federal
governments have legitimate regulatory interests and obligations 87—and
where bright-line, categorical rules of adjudication can result in
frustratingly arbitrary results. 88 The Constitution provides some guidance
for adjudicating this jurisdictional overlap, enumerating certain powers to
the federal government and reserving others to the states, with the
Supremacy Clause supposedly policing the boundary in between. 89 Even
so, we sometimes characterize the Supremacy Clause as policing the
boundary between state and federal power in terms of a categorical rule,
strictly separating realms of exclusive state and federal jurisdiction, 90
while other times we construe it to allow hierarchical but concurrent and
dynamic jurisdiction. 91
These, as Coan points out, are the circumstances that Justice Cardozo
had in mind when he argued in Carter Coal for a more contextually
responsive analysis of Commerce Clause violations. 92 Yet the Supreme
Court took a different approach in Carter Coal, articulating what Coan

86.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at xii, 8–11; U.S. CONST. amend. X
(explaining that the powers not delegated in the Constitution are reserved to states and the
people); U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–2, 8 (stating that legislative powers are vested in
Congress); U.S. CONST. amend XII (describing the state role in presidential elections).
87.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 145–80; see also Erin Ryan, Federalism
and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray
Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 567–84 (2007).
88.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 145–80; see also Ryan, Federalism at the
Cathedral, supra note 72, at 57–88.
89.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 10.
90.
As we do, for example, in dividing state and federal jurisdiction over water
resources under the Clean Water Act, or in matters of immigration law. See RYAN,
F&TWW, supra note 4, at 311–19.
91.
As we do, for example, in vast areas of environmental, health, and safety
law, where federal statues set a national floor of regulation that states may not undercut,
but which allow states to set a higher level of concurrent regulatory policy. See Ryan,
EF&TWW, supra note 78; William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceiling, and the Benefits
of Federalism’s Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 98 (William W. Buzbee ed. 2009); Ann E.
Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009);
Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006).
92.
COAN, supra note 1, at 62 (discussing Cardozo’s dissent in Carter Coal).
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regards as a rule of categorical deference to Congress. 93 And during the
Rehnquist Court era, the Supreme Court began applying bright-line rules
in the opposite direction, in exactly those federalism contexts where Coan,
I, and presumably Justice Cardozo believe it should have been applying
standards. 94
For example, in 1992, the Court created the categorical Tenth
Amendment “anti-commandeering” rule in New York v. United States, 95
which prevents the federal government from forcing state actors to
participate in a federal regulatory regime. 96 There is much to recommend
a bright-line default rule to prevent federal commandeering of state actors,
but as I have pointed out in previous work, this decision did not only create
a default rule against commandeering, it protected that bright-line rule
with an inalienability remedy rule that doubly categorically prevents the
state and federal governments from bargaining around the default. 97
Borrowing from Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s famous model
of property, liability, and inalienability remedy rule alternatives for
vindicating legal entitlements in One View of the Cathedral, 98 I have
shown that the Court’s award to the states of the anti-commandeering
entitlement was partnered with an inalienability rule that prevents them
from initiating federalism bargaining—even when the states see it as
necessary and preferable to alternatives. 99 The rule is also confusing
because it stands in such contrast to the property-rule protected
jurisdictional entitlements that the Court administers under the Spending
Clause, which allow the state and federal governments more freedom to
negotiate around the jurisdictional defaults established by the Constitution
through bargaining over access to federal funds. 100
The facts underlying the New York case demonstrate exactly the gray
area circumstances in which Coan and I suggest bright-line rules will lack
the flexibility and nuance needed for good legal decision-making. In the
last ditch effort to resolve a collective action dilemma among the states
that had led to a near shut-down of all available disposal facilities for
93.
Id. at 61–62. See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 314–16
(1936) (“What authority has this court, by construction, to convert the manifest purpose of
Congress to regulate . . . ?”).
94.
See RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 109–44.
95.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
96.
Id.
97.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 215–64. See also Ryan, Federalism at the
Cathedral, supra note 72, at 57–58.
98.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
99.
Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 72; RYAN, F&TWW, supra
note 4, at 243.
100. RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 215–53; Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral,
supra note 72, at 78–79; See also Ryan, Spending Power, supra note 49.
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radioactive waste, the states partnered with Congress to pass a federal law,
the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which enacted a stategenerated plan. 101 Led by New York, the states effectively bargained with
Congress to harness an aspect of federal regulatory capacity that the states
needed to actualize their exhaustively negotiated plan: the force of the
Supremacy Clause, needed to bind all states to the promises they made to
share responsibility for fairly siting radioactive waste. 102 However, when
the Court invalidated the resulting “Take Title” provision of the law as
commandeering New York State—a provision that New York State had
itself championed behind the veil of ignorance 103—the narrow majority in
New York effectively held that the states and Congress could not bargain
this way, even if the states had been the initiators of bargaining. 104 Thirty
years later, the problem of radioactive waste disposal remains largely
unresolved (especially compromising public safety in the few states that
continue to site it for the rest), suggesting how valuable that federalism
bargaining would have been in resolving a serious interjurisdictional
problem. 105
While the anti-commandeering rule makes sense in many contexts,
the controversial facts of the New York case show that it might not make
sense in all contexts, including some very high-stakes contexts with
substantial public impacts. Indeed, this is exactly the problem with
categorical, bright-line rules that remove judicial discretion to consider the
complex facts in gray area contexts. In this case, applying the bright-line,
anti-commandeering rule—buttressed by an immobilizing inalienability
remedy rule—removed the needed tool of state-federal bargaining to reach
a bilaterally negotiated, finely-tuned allocation of authority, in the absence
of fixed constitutional entitlements in a realm of deep jurisdictional
overlap, where both the states and federal government had clear claims to
regulatory authority and obligation. I have long argued that this is not
conducive toward good governance, 106 and Coan argues that it is the
inevitable result of judicial capacity constraints, because allowing courts
to consider that level of nuance would force more high-volume, highstakes litigation on the judiciary than it can handle. 107

. . .”).

101.
102.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149–50 (1992).
Id. at 181 (“[T]he Act embodies a bargain among the sited and unsited States

103.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 166.
104.
Id. at 224–26; Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 72, at 7–8.
105.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 227; Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral,
supra note 72, at 8.
106.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 264; Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral,
supra note 72, at 3–4, 77–78.
107.
COAN, supra note 1, at 19.
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B. Limited Judicial Competence and Negotiated Federalism

It is from this perspective that Coan’s theory was especially
interesting to me, because his recognition that capacity constraints limit
judicial competence to adjudicate complex federalism dilemmas lends
support to the idea I have proposed that other institutional actors may
sometimes have superior competence to interpret the constitutionally
appropriate result. 108 Even though we normally think of constitutional
interpretation as something courts are best situated to perform, Andy’s
insights support the idea that in contexts where judicial capacity limits
competence, we may rightly look to the political branches for superior
competence—at least when they are allocating contested jurisdictional
entitlements bilaterally, across state-federal lines, and through legitimately
conducted bargaining that honors the principles of mutual consent.109
Coan and I share the view that underappreciated limitations on judicial
competence may mean that the Court is not always the branch best
equipped to interpret the allocation of jurisdictional entitlements in
complex federalism dilemmas. My work on negotiated federalism goes a
step further in arguing that bilateral interpretation by negotiating state and
federal actors may more faithfully vindicate the underlying constitutional
principles that federalism is designed to protect. 110
It was the aforementioned critique of the anti-bargaining rule in New
York that inspired my fuller research agenda into federalism bargaining,
which explored how frequently state and federal actors use various forms
of bargaining to bilaterally allocate contested authority in gray-area
contexts of jurisdictional overlap. 111 I discovered a vast enterprise of
negotiated federalism, including instances of direct cooperation,
statutorily staged coordination, dynamic competition, and channels for
dissent. 112 In previous work, I provided a typology of ten different ways
that state and federal actors negotiate with one another, including: (1)
conventional forms of federalism bargaining (such as enforcement

108.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 155–56, 314–15, 362–67; Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 4–5.
109.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 354 (“The principle of mutual consent
underlies our faith in the bargaining process, conferring legitimacy on negotiated results
so long as these three underlying assumptions are met: (1) bargaining autonomy, (2)
interest literacy, and (3) faithful representation.”). See also id. at 342–47; Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 105–10.
110.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 339; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra
note 3, at 21–23.
111.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 280–319, 340–41; Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, supra note 3, at 24–73.
112.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 308, 316–29, 340–41; Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, supra note 3, at 4–5.
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negotiations or interest-group bargaining over lawmaking); 113 (2) statefederal negotiations to reallocate authority (such as spending power
bargaining, by which the federal government negotiates for access to
authority otherwise constitutionally delegated to the states, or the
congressional authorization of interstate compacts that allow states to
encroach on areas of federal Commerce Clause authority); 114 and (3) the
statutorily-driven joint policymaking forums (which are advanced
programs of cooperative federalism with elaborate systems of rules to
encourage, facilitate, and organize bargaining between state and federal
actors concurrently operating in selected corners of the gray area). 115
Examples range from single-issue deal making to programmatic platforms
to subtler forms of intersystemic signaling (for example, over marijuana
policy 116), but in each instance, the end result is some jointly constructed
plan of action that takes account of both local and national interests and
expertise. 117
In this previous work, I have offered a fuller theory of federalism
interpretation that allocates roles among all three branches of government
in different circumstances. 118 However, the most controversial claim is
that, at least when certain constraints of fair bargaining are met, bilateral
intergovernmental bargaining around elusive jurisdictional lines can
produce more constitutionally principled and pragmatically robust results
than judicial administration. 119 Given that the underlying federalism
values—checks and balances, transparency and accountability, localism
and nationalism, and interjurisdictional synergy—are largely procedural
values for balancing different levels of public interest and expertise, I
argue that the process of bilaterally negotiating results within gray-area
federalism dilemmas can prove the most faithful means of vindicating the
values that underlie federalism itself.
113.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 283–87; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism,
supra note 3, at 28–37.
114.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 288–96 (discussing legal interest
implicating the Commerce Clause, such as the interstate waterways and No Child Left
Behind); Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 28–50.
115.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 296–314, 359; Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, supra note 3, at 50–73 (discussing statutory programs that explicitly lay out
how the different players are going to coordinate in the project of joint governance, such
as the Coastal Zone Management Act and the Clear Air Act’s treatment of mobile sources).
116.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 311–13; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism,
supra note 3, at 70–72.
117.
See, e.g., RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 268–72, 315–16, 339–41; Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, 50–73. This research relies on the negotiation
theorist’s definition of bargaining: a jointly constructed decision taken through an iterative
process of communication. RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 268 n.12.
118.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 370–71.
119.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 367; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra
note 3, at 136.
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We have already acknowledged that federalism interpretation
involves an adjudication among competing incommensurate values that
could be resolved in multiple possible ways, so it is illusory to think that a
court alone can come to the “right answer.” 120 In federalism dilemmas, we
are seeking the best possible answer among many, further reducing the
edge that judicial adjudication holds over competing means of resolution.
By producing a result that honors both local and national interests and
expertise through a fair process of genuinely consensual negotiation,
federalism bargaining may well advance those values better than a single
judge or panel of judges on a court. 121 Coan’s capacity theory in Rationing
the Constitution adds the potential corollary that federalism bargaining
will almost certainly advance those values more effectively than a judicial
panel administering a categorical, bright-line, necessarily over- and underinclusive rule—one whose primary claim to value is simply that it is easy
for an overwhelmed judiciary to administer. 122
In adopting categorical rules of federalism interpretation, the
Supreme Court has often framed its role in adjudicating federalism
dilemmas as though it is policing a zero-sum game, 123 in which a bright
line separates state and federal prerogative, and wherever the Court draws
that line determines what one side wins and what the other side loses. 124
By excluding the possibility of nuance and overlap, categorical rules reify
this simplistic, zero-sum view of federalism. But as I’ve argued
previously, the line between state and federal power is itself a project of
ongoing negotiation, and the best federalism-sensitive governance often
incorporates multiscalar contributions that can reward both sides of the
continuum in the ways that matter to them. 125 The intergovernmental
federalism bargaining I’ve described belies this outdated zero-sum view,
increasing the prize available to both sides by ensuring that policy is
formed with attention to both local and national concerns and competence,
empowering interests on both sides of the line. 126
Coan’s work is important to this line of reasoning, because it suggests
how the limits of judicial capacity can operate to dumb-down the Court’s
120.
See supra Part II.A.
121.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 367; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra
note 3, at 134–35.
122.
COAN, supra note 1, at 19–31; RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 356–61;
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 121–28.
123.
Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism Past the Zero-Sum Game, 38 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS 4, 4 (2012).
124.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 267–70; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism,
supra note 3, at 84–86.
125.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 268–72, 315–16, 339–41; Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 110–27.
126.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 267–71; Ryan, Negotiating Federalism,
supra note 3, at 4–8.
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federalism jurisprudence, reducing it to rules of categorical prerogative127
that run counter to the more sophisticated mechanics of joint decisionmaking that has allowed our multijurisdictional system of governance to
thrive. 128 If he’s right, it’s all the more worth considering the ways in
which negotiated federalism can be a legitimate form of constitutional
interpretation, especially in those realms in which courts lack capacity to
do more than offer categorical rules.
I could obviously say much more about all this, but instead, I’ll turn
now to some of the limits of Coan’s insightful work that we should
nevertheless also consider.
III. WHEN IN THE GLASS HOUSE…
This Part explores some potential limits of the Capacity theory as
Coan has presented it. In turning to them here, I begin with the implied
corollary to the scientific aphorism I quoted earlier: “some models are
useful, but all are wrong.” 129 In this case, as with all others, while there are
clearly some very useful aspects to the Capacity model, there are also some
that bear further scrutiny. In particular, and notwithstanding Coan’s robust
critique of categorical rules, it seems that Coan inadvertently applies one
himself—conflating some of the critical distinctions we should recognize
between the categorical deference that the Court applies in some contexts
and the deferential but discretionary review that it applies in others. In
addition, Coan distinguishes the Capacity model from the Attitudinal,
Legalist, and Strategic models of judicial interpretation that preceded it,
and argues that Capacity is superior to all—but I’ll argue that the Capacity
model has a more symbiotic than antagonistic relationship with them, and
indeed, is already accounted for within them.
A. Avoid Stone-Throwing
I begin with Andy’s ironic use of overly categorical thinking to
characterize Supreme Court decision-making in high-stakes and highvolume domains. In critiquing what he sees as the Court’s tendency to
oversimplify complexity with crude categorical decision rules, Coan
nevertheless sets forth a model that is at least partially built on a
simplifying categorical analysis. This little irony preoccupied me
throughout the book (prompting reflection of the conventional advice to
people in glass houses). Coan ably critiques the Court’s tendency to apply
127.
COAN, supra note 1, at 19–31.
128.
RYAN, F&TWW, supra note 4, at 368–72, 315–16, 339–41; Ryan,
Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3 at 91–92.
129.
See The Royal Statistical Society, supra note 51 (citing the original
aphorism: “[a]ll models are wrong, but some are useful.”).
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ill-fitting categorical rules where flexible standards are needed for the
purpose of judicial economy, 130 but Coan’s own analysis also threatens to
oversimplify the Court’s performance by overgeneralizing important
distinctions in the rules it deploys. I generally agree with the broad outlines
of Coan’s argument, so I don’t want to overstate this point, but in some of
the areas of law he critiques, the Court’s jurisprudence is more complex
than the book gives credit for.
For example, Coan is right that the Court applies overly rigid brightline rules in some areas of its federalism jurisprudence, including the
categorical 10th Amendment anti-commandeering rule 131 (where, in past
work, I have also argued that a standard allowing at least some forms of
consensual bargaining would make more sense). 132 However, I’m not sure
his analysis applies in all areas of the Court’s federalism jurisprudence—
even some of the specific realms he considers in the book, like the judicial
treatment of the Commerce and Spending powers. As Coan suggests, the
Court does apply a bright-line rule to bar intentional discrimination under
the Commerce Clause, 133 but at the same time, it assesses
nondiscriminatory measures under the dormant aspect of the Commerce
Clause using the Pike balancing test, a flexible standard. 134 The force of
the Pike balancing test may be waning at the moment, 135 but for decades,
it has balanced the burden on Commerce against the relative putative local
benefits. 136 There’s no finessing this—the Court deployed a vague,
flexible, context-responsive standard in interpreting Congress’s reach
under the Commerce Clause, which the Capacity theory pointedly asserts
the Court should not do.
Similarly, Coan characterizes the Court’s Spending Clause
jurisprudence as a blanket grant of deference to Congress, enabling
130.
COAN, supra note 1, at 49, 62, 70.
131.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
132.
Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 72, at 66.
133.
COAN, supra note 1, at 63 (“The Court formalized this categorical rule of
deference in the rational basis test announced in Katzenbach v. McClung, which upheld
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of the commerce power. Simply
put, where legislators ‘have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme
necessary to the protection of commerce,’ the Court held, ‘our investigation is at an end.’
Suffice it to say, this test is very easily satisfied.” (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 304 (1964)).
134.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
135.
The Roberts Court has cast doubt on the future of the Pike balancing test in
United Haulers, where Justice Roberts wrote: “There is a common thread to [the plaintiff’s]
arguments: They are invitations to rigorously scrutinize economic legislation passed under
the auspices of the police power. There was a time when this Court presumed to make such
binding judgments for society, under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause
[referencing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)]. We should not seek to reclaim that
ground for judicial supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause.” United
Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 347 (2007).
136.
Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral, supra note 72, at 22.
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virtually any jurisdictional bargain that Congress trades for with federal
funds to pass muster, 137 but in its most recent spending power decision,
National Federation of Independent Businesses, the Court articulated a
notoriously vague rule confounding that blanket deference with a vague
standard. 138 Under the new rule, Congress may not condition a state’s
receipt of certain federal funds within an entrenched spending power
partnership on that state’s assent to an independent program if the funds at
stake are so substantial that the threat of losing them operates to coerce the
state’s consent. 139 It effectively proscribes Congress from bullying a state
into accepting a program it doesn’t want by leveraging the state’s reliance
on a large and long-standing but unrelated federally supported program, 140
but as even Coan concedes, the new rule is riddled with uncertainty about
how to distinguish related and unrelated programs, and how big a reliance
interest must be before the rule is triggered. 141 Scholars siding with the
dissenting voice in this case have complained that nobody really knows
what this test means. 142
Even South Dakota v. Dole, 143 the gold standard for adjudicating
Spending Clause disputes—and the case that Coan relies on for his
assertion of blanket deference—arguably includes a standard, albeit a
deferential standard. 144 In Dole, the Court held that Congress may place
conditions on states’ receipt of federal funds so long as they (1) promote
the general welfare, (2) are unambiguous, (3) are reasonably related (or
“germane”) to the federal interest, (4) do not induce independent
constitutional violations, and (5) are not coercive. 145 The third factor, the
“germaneness” inquiry, requires a discretionary assessment of whether the
conditions are reasonably related to the putative federal interest. 146 Indeed,
but the debate among the justices hearing the challenge to the National
Minimum Drinking Act in Dole bitterly debated the application of the

137. COAN, supra note 1, at 77–80 (discussing that since the Supreme Court’s
spending power decision in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), “the consensus
view of commentators, supported by twenty-five years of decisions following Dole, was
that the decision represented a blank check to Congress.”).
138.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574–85 (2012).
139.
Id.
140.
See id. at 581–82; Spending Power, supra note 49, at 1030.
141.
COAN, supra note 1, at 66.
142.
See e.g., Ryan, Spending Power, supra note 49, at 1022; Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO.
L.J. 861, 866–73 (2013).
143.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
144.
Id. at 207–08.
145.
Id.
146.
Ryan, Spending Power, supra note 49, at 1015; Bagenstos, supra note 142,
at 918.
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germaneness criteria to the facts 147—demonstrating that while the standard
may be applied deferentially, it cannot be considered a bright-line rule of
categorical deference.
Coan also considers the Court’s rules for assessing alleged regulatory
takings as an example of categorical deference, 148 even though the seminal
Penn Central regulatory balancing test is expressly framed as a
discretionary balancing test among three orthogonal factors. 149 Under that
test, the adjudicator does not categorically defer to the government: it must
weigh the economic impact of the regulation on the owner, the extent it
interferes with the owner’s reasonable, investment-backed expectations,
and the character of the government action. 150
Coan’s answer to this critique is doubtlessly that while these legal
rules are framed as standards, they are actually applied as categorical
deference, and thus consistent with his argument. 151 No conditional
spending deals have ever failed the Dole standard, and regulatory takings
challenges rarely succeed (at least in federal court). 152 But here’s where
Coan’s categorical analysis conflates two significantly different legal
phenomena: deferential standards are not interchangeable with categorical
deference. He’s certainly right that many of these standards are applied
very deferentially, but that’s not the same thing as deference without
discretion, and conflating the two masks some important regulatory
nuance operating in the background, on the supply side as well as the
demand side.
Even seldom violated standards do regulatory work that is distinctive
from the automated line-drawing of nondiscretionary deference. When
there is categorical deference, we already know the answer before the
question in each case has even been framed. But deferential standards
allow courts to appropriately defer to legislative judgement while still
preserving the option to police for abuses. The factors in a deferential
standard have meaning. Institutional actors think about them while
crafting laws and later deciding whether to fight or to fold if they are
challenged. By outlining the factors that a reviewing court will consider,
147.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found
the germaneness test satisfied, while Justice O’Connor, writing for the dissent, did not. Id.
at 208–16.
148.
COAN, supra note 1, at 149–51.
149.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
150.
Id. at 124.
151.
COAN, supra note 1, at 83–87.
152.
However, the same cannot be said of regulatory takings claims made in state
courts, on the basis of the same test. See, e.g., De Cook v. Rochester Int’l Airport Joint
Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 2011) (holding that the government engaged in a
regulatory taking under the Penn Central test); see also Phillips v. Montgomery County
442 S.W.3d 233 (Tenn. 2014) (using the Penn Central test to hold that the landowners’
claim of a regulatory taking was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss).
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such standards can provide incentives for regulatory actors to plan on the
basis of set criteria, to avoid the force of the rule in litigation. They can
influence stakeholder decisions about litigation, and establish the
parameters for bargaining. 153
They can also provide important guidance around which parties can
structure their behavior, as in the context of regulatory takings. Even
though the Penn Central balancing test is seldom failed, the three factors
introduce substantive considerations that can operate to constrain
regulatory activity to stay within the boundaries of the deference courts
are likely to afford them.
Moreover, deferential standards can be used to set a federal
regulatory floor that state courts and legislatures can meet or exceed,
providing another important intersection between judicially crafted rules
and standards in the federalism context. For example, the Supreme Court
did exactly this in its treatment of economic development takings in Kelo
v. New London, 154 in which it set forth a rule of categorical deference, but
invited states to take a more stringent position. 155 And indeed, at least half
the state have done since then, either by judicial or legislative rulemaking. 156 So conflating deferential standards with categorical deference
shortchanges the distinction, and failing to acknowledge the nuance here
limits the utility of the theory.
B. Covert Cooperation Among Competing Models
Finally, I want to discuss the relationship between the capacity model
and the other models that Coan argues it outperforms. There is certainly
much value to be gleaned from Coan’s capacity theory for understanding
constitutional rulemaking, especially when it is used in combination with
other models—but I’m not sure that it stands on its own as reliably as it
sets out to do.
The model is very convincing in some important ways, but of course,
it would be even more convincing if all the justices always acted in ways
the model anticipates. Yet that rarely happens. As even Coan
acknowledges, for example, both Justice Cardozo and Justice Thomas
have rejected categorical deference in the context of the Commerce Clause

153.
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 3, at 133–34; Ryan, EFTWW,
supra note 78, at 366–67.
154.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
155.
Id. at 489–90.
156.
See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and
Federal Legislative and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703 (2011);
Harvey M. Jacobs & Ellen M. Bassett, After “Kelo” Political Rhetoric and Policy
Responses, LAND LINES, Apr. 2012, at 14–15 (“Following the invitation of the court, [fortythree] states adopted laws that appear to challenge Kelo . . .”).
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in different contexts. 157 Coan celebrates Justice Cardozo’s proposed
standard in Carter Coal as an alternative to categorical deference. 158 Even
though they are both minority views, the capacity model predicts that
justices shouldn’t take these positions—which means that there must be
something else also operating in the background—some other model or
models to explain what else is driving these justices to go in these different
directions. So capacity can’t be the only theoretical model that is doing
work, or operating in the background of interpretive decision-making by
the Court.
In the end, I had to question the severity of the isolation that Coan
creates around the constraints of capacity, in opposition to the other
models he identifies, such as the legalist, attitudinal, and strategic models.
Because in the end, I see the Capacity Model not just as something in
opposition to these other models, but as something already baked into
these other models in fundamental ways. There is clear symbiosis between
capacity and each of the others, and perhaps all of them together. After all,
concern for judicial capacity is both a legalist and attitudinal concern, and
with strategic implications as well. Doctrinal concerns for administrability
are a capacity-driven concern. “Legalist” adherence to principles of
judicial restraint reflect embedded administrability concerns about
preserving national uniformity and predictability within minimum
professional standards. Strategic agendas break down if judges create
decision rules that cannot be effectively administered within the present
system.
Even Coan recognizes the synergy that must exist among these
models, even as he argues that the capacity model is superior, 159 but I’m
not as sure as he is that it’s truly possible to isolate them from one another.
Capacity is just as important an element in these other models, just as these
other models are implicitly bound up with the capacity model’s concern
for legitimacy and results—because otherwise, the justices would not care
about achieving minimal professional standards or disuniformity across
the federal circuits. Indeed, the very underpinnings of the capacity model
necessarily implies legalist and strategic considerations. The Court could
decide as many cases as it wants to by flipping a coin, but it doesn’t take
that route, because it is too committed up those (pesky) legalistic
principles of due process and the rule of law. So I agree with Coan that it’s
useful to be able to distinguish these as separate inputs to an overall model
of Supreme Court decision-making, but in the end, I see them as much
more intertwined than his book suggests.
157.
COAN, supra note 1, at 60–62.
158.
Id. at 70 (explaining that Justice Cardozo’s approach seems “more consistent
with both constitutional text and constitutional structure than any of the Court’s categorical
limits . . .”).
159.
See COAN, supra note 1, at 47–50.
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CONCLUSION: AN INVITATION TO NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
I conclude with an open invitation for Coan, now that he has opened
this Pandora’s Box, to give us the normative analysis that his positive
account so sorely begs. Andy, now that we fully understand all the
problems limited judicial capacity can create for good judicial
administration and good governance in general—what does the path
forward look like?
Having provided this powerful account of how capacity constraints
predetermine Supreme Court decision-making, I’d encourage Coan to
think more seriously about the appropriate remedy for the problems he has
identified. He makes a strong case that limited judicial capacity can lead
to suboptimal judicial decision-making, especially in legal realms
threatened by high volumes of high-stakes litigation. Still, I’m not clear
on what he thinks we should do about this, and one could draw markedly
different conclusions from his analysis.
If we are convinced by his account of all the problems that can flow
from limited judicial capacity, is the right answer is to simply increase
capacity? Should we expand the federal judiciary by hiring more personnel
who can spent more time and energy dealing with the intricacies and
nuances of constitutional dilemmas in each case and controversy in which
they arise? Will seating more federal judges enable the Supreme Court to
articulate more of the context-responsive standards that he, Justice
Cardozo, and I might prefer?
Or, alternatively, is the proper conclusion from Coan’s work that we
should have fewer judges? Should we reduce the size and importance of
the judiciary, shifting some of that interpretive authority to the political
branches instead, because courts are inevitably incapable of managing the
responsibilities we heap upon them with the requisite care? Is the promise
of individualized judicial review more a pipe-dream than an actualizable
reality? Should we accordingly concede defeat and reduce the judicial role,
because courts are inherently ill-equipped to deal with high-volume, highstakes issues in the first place? Will capacity issues, like a chicken and egg
problem, always strain judicial competence, because the more finely
grained review they can provide, the more litigation will chase after those
resources until they are limited once again?
Coan’s palpable frustration with what he sees as the failures and
limitations of judicial review almost seems to call for this kind of solution,
though it would produce formal structural deference to the political
branches that may be similar to what he critiques now. This would enable
legislative and regulatory dispute resolution at a more fine-grained level,
and with more limited judicial oversight, perhaps not unlike the categorical
judicial deference Coan critiques here—but at least we would be up front
about what we were doing. Another potential result could be more
negotiations among the relevant stakeholders—something my own work
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might seem to champion—but even I don’t believe that negotiation is the
appropriate tool for resolving conflict in all contexts. 160 It can work in the
federalism context, where incommensurate values within legal realms of
heightened jurisdictional uncertainty creates a forum amenable to
bilaterally negotiated consensus, but I’m not sure that negotiation is the
right answer when it comes to adjudicating equal protection in contexts of
extreme power imbalances, often involving the civil rights of the
vulnerable. We don’t generally think that people should bargain over
human rights.
And while upstarts like me and Coan will still argue at the margins,
maybe—just maybe—the judiciary is roughly right about the restraint with
which it administers its own role, at least in general. Imagine what the
legal world would look like if the Court did not treat legislative and
executive rulemaking with so much deference in high stakes, high volume
arenas? Right now, the Court saves the power to reject duly enacted laws
and regulation as a big stick that it holds in the background, while it speaks
more softly in the foreground through deferential standards. So long as the
stick is there, it has meaning. But if we reversed those postures, imagine
the potential for judicial tyranny, and the political turmoil it would
unleash. The complaints we regularly hear today about judicial lawmaking
under the Court’s current practices would seem quaint.
So at least in general, perhaps this is the better balance, and we can
affirm the prevalence of deferential judicial rules for principled reasons
that go beyond the principle-neutral acknowledgement of the limits of
judicial capacity. Even so, the same might not be true for bright line rules
created by the Court that are not deferential. When the Court strikes down
duly-enacted lawmaking, perhaps that is when it owes the more nuanced
consideration that Coan and I advocate for. My own personal take is that
when the core constitutional promises associated with human rights are
implicated, the Court is on its most solid ground in rejecting federal
lawmaking under a bright line rule (for example, against race
discrimination). But when it engages structural constitutional promises
that are almost never as substantively clear, bright-line rules are perhaps
more perilous. 161
160. RYAN, F&TTW, supra note 4, at 354–55 (“To reiterate the critical caveats,
the interpretive potential within federalism bargaining does not mean that every bargain
between state and federal actors will always be faithful to federalism, nor does it mean that
all federalism-sensitive governance should be negotiated.”).
161.
Id. at 348–49 (“In contrast to adjudicating rights, a substantive realm in
which the Constitution’s directions are relatively clear, the adjudication of federalism
draws on penumbral implications in the text that leave much more to interpretation. The
boundary between state and federal authority is implied by structural directives such as the
enumeration of federal powers in Article I and the retention of state power in the Tenth
Amendment, but neither commands the clarify of commitment that the Constitution makes
to identifiable individual rights . . .”).
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Which is all to say, dear Andy, that you’ve set a splendid table, but
there’s more work to be done on the meal! Having discussed this matter
with you already, I know that you had intended the book as a purely
descriptive project, without normative recommendations—but having
delivered the analysis you did, I think it’s incumbent on you now to go
further. We will all look forward to the next chapter, and in the meanwhile,
we thank you for inviting us to share your fascinating intellectual journey
to this point.
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